Some protected password change protocols were proposed. However, the previous protocols were easily vulnerable to several attacks such as denial of service, password guessing, stolen-verifier and impersonation attacks etc. Recently, Chang et al. proposed a simple authenticated key agreement and protected password change protocol for enhancing the security and efficiency. In this paper, authors shall show that password guessing, denial of service and known-key attacks can work in their password change protocol. At the same time, authors shall propose a new password change protocol to withstand all the threats of security.
Introduction
Password is a short secret. Hence, it is easily be remembered by communication parties and can enhance the efficiency of the scheme. Many password-based authentication schemes were proposed [4] [5] [6] [7] . However, the disadvantages of the scheme are easily vulnerable to the guessing, replay, denial of service and stolen-verifier attacks etc.
Beside that, a key agreement scheme should be considered into a password-based authentication scheme for enhancing the security. Recently, Peyravian and Zunic [8] proposed an authentication scheme for protecting password transmission by using one-way hash function [9] . In 2001, Tseng et al. [10] pointed out that their scheme was vulnerable to the server spoofing attack. At the same time, Tseng proposed an improvement based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme [2] . Not only that, many attacks and improvements were discussed continually [3] [4] [11] [12] [13] .
Recently, Chang et al. [1] proposed a simple authenticated key agreement and protected password change protocol for overcoming the above attacks. In this paper, authors shall show protocol. Finally, authors shall make a conclusion for this paper.
Review of Chang et al.'s password change protocol
In this section, authors shall go over Chang et al.'s password change protocol and show that their protocol's weaknesses as follows.
Chang et al.'s scheme
Let p and q are two large prime numbers. g is a generator with order q in GF(p). Two communication parties, Alice and Bob, share a secret password pw.
Step 1: Alice selects a random number a and computes R A = g a mod p. Alice sends (R A pw
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Security analysis

Conclusion
In this paper, authors show that Chang et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing, denial of service and known-key attacks respectively. Authors also propose a new password change protocol to withstand all the threats of security..
